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Abstract: Entrepreneurs are surprisingly unlikely to have partners. In spite of the obvious advantages to 
forming partnerships, only a small minority of entrepreneurs (less than 10%, excluding family businesses) 
have partners. A number of possible explanations exist for this puzzling phenomenon, including an 
inability to locate suitable partners, fear of moral hazard, and a preference for not working in groups. 
Utilizing a diverse subject population with a high proportion of active entrepreneurs, we use a team 
production experiment to study whether entrepreneurs prefer to work alone or in a team. The data indicate 
that entrepreneurs, while no less likely to be good teammates, are substantially less interested in joining 
teams. This suggests that efforts to encourage partnership among entrepreneurs may run contrary to the 
preferences of this group. 
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 1. Introduction: Entrepreneurship is a strikingly anti-social activity. According to Shane (2007, p. 75), 
“between 50 and 60 percent of all new businesses are founded by a single individual.” Most firms that 
have more than one founder are started by spouses or relatives (e.g. mom and pop businesses), so that 
“less than 10 percent of all new businesses are founded by teams of nonrelatives.” This statistic is 
surprising since the presence of a business partner has been shown to increase the performance of start-up 
firms (Cooper and Bruno, 1977; Feeser and Willard, 1990; Reynolds and White, 1997; Schutjens and 
Wever, 2000). Starting a business with a partner gives an entrepreneur several advantages, including 
increased start-up capital,1 specialization by partners, and improved decision making by teams (Kerr and 
Tindale, 2004). Given the generally miserable performance of entrepreneurial ventures (Evans and 
Leighton, 1989; Shane, 2007), it seems reasonable that entrepreneurs should want to seize upon any 
possible advantage. 
 
Given the potential benefits of forming a partnership, it remains unclear (and little studied) 2 why 
entrepreneurs generally start firms alone. One possible explanation is that nascent entrepreneurs are 
isolated from potential partners due to a lack of social and business networks. A second possibility is that 
entrepreneurs avoid partnerships due to fear of moral hazard. Such concerns would be especially justified 
if moral hazard was more prevalent among individuals who become entrepreneurs than in the general 
population. Finally, the lack of partners may reflect a distinctive feature of entrepreneurs’ preferences. 
There exist several pieces of evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs have psychological traits which make 
team membership undesirable for them. Analyzing data from a large national survey of entrepreneurs, the 
Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), Reynolds and Curtin (2008) found that entrepreneurs 
were more motivated by a preference for autonomy than a desire for wealth. This preference for autonomy 
could be one of the factors leading to fewer partnerships, but Reynolds and Curtin used a broad measure 
of autonomy that also included preferences for greater freedom and flexibility in lifestyle. The importance 
of autonomy as a reason for establishing a new business is particularly strong for women, so this result 
may reflect a need for flexible work hours to deal with childcare issues rather than a desire for 
independence. On a related theme, there is also evidence that entrepreneurs have a relatively high need for 
control as measured by nAch scores.3  Since having a partner reduces an entrepreneur’s control over what 
happens in their business, a relatively high need for control could motivate the decision by many 
entrepreneurs to work alone. Unfortunately, much of the evidence suggests that a high need for control is 
a general trait of business managers rather than a distinctive feature of entrepreneurs.4 Thus, the literature 
contains indirect evidence that entrepreneurs might have a lower willingness than their peers to work with 
a partner, but lacks compelling direct evidence. 
 
                                                     
1 Fairlie and Robb (2007) show that increasing start-up capital improves the survival rate of new firms. 
2 Studies of entrepreneurship and teams have focused on other topics such as the composition of teams (Ruef,  
Aldrich, and Carter, 2003), the success rate of teams versus individual start-ups (Schutjens and Wever, 2000), and 
entry into and/or exit from into existing entrepreneurial teams (Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn, and Sapienza, 
2006; Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright, and Westhead, 2003).  
3 This is a common psychological measure of whether individuals have an internal locus of control. One trait of high 
nAch individuals is a preference for settings in which they have direct control over the outcome. 
4 Multiple studies find that entrepreneurs have higher nAch scores than the general population (Shapero, 1977; 
Bowen and Hisrich, 1986; Durand, 1975). However, it is also well established that managers do not differ 
significantly from entrepreneurs in this trait (Babb and Babb,1992; Brockhaus, 1982). 
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The primary goal of this research is to provide direct evidence that entrepreneurs exhibit stronger 
preferences for working alone than similar non-entrepreneurs. As a secondary goal, we also study whether 
the behavior of entrepreneurs is different in a team setting than that of similar non-entrepreneurs. We 
accomplish these goals by examining team production decisions in an experimental setting, utilizing a 
diverse subject population with a high proportion of active entrepreneurs. Subjects engaged in a real effort 
task, answering logic questions from the GMAT. In an initial phase, subjects played in isolation and were 
paid based on how many questions they answered in a five minute period. For the second phase of the 
experiment, subjects were randomly paired with a partner and spent another five minutes answering 
questions. Critically, payoffs from each question were allocated ex ante to either an individual account or 
a group account. The group account paid 50% more than the individual account, but group payoffs were 
split evenly between partners. Individual payoffs were maximized by allocating all questions to the 
individual account, but team payoffs were maximized if all questions were allocated to the team account. 
The structure of payoffs in the second phase allows for moral hazard, letting us identify whether 
entrepreneurs are more prone to moral hazard in teams than otherwise similar non-entrepreneurs. At the 
beginning of the third and final phase of the experiment, subjects bid for the right to play in a team. 
Potential bids include negative numbers, making it possible for subjects to display a preference for 
playing as individuals. Depending on their bid and a randomly drawn price, subjects either played the 
final phase by themselves or with a new randomly chosen partner. We use subjects’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) to play in a team as our primary measure of their preference for working with a partner versus 
working alone.  
 
We find that entrepreneurs are no more prone to moral hazard than similar individuals. In Stage 2 of the 
experiment, subjects who are full-time entrepreneurs and older than 30 allocate 67% of the questions to 
the team account as compared with 65% for other subjects who are older than 30. This result provides 
little support for the idea that the aversion of entrepreneurs to forming partnerships is due in part to 
unusually high levels of moral hazard among entrepreneurs. We observe strong positive age effects on the 
willingness of subjects to allocate questions to the team account, paralleling the results of Charness and 
Villeval (2009).5  Subjects’ aptitude for answering GMAT questions and subjects’ income both have 
negative effects on allocations to the team account, albeit only weakly in the case of income. 
 
Entrepreneurs are dramatically less willing to pay to join a team for the final stage of the experiment. 
Subjects who are full-time entrepreneurs and older than 30 bid significantly less to join a team than other 
subjects who are older than 30. The magnitude of the difference is large, representing 25% of the average 
payoff for the final stage of the experiment. This negative effect is almost entirely due to the subset of 
subjects who are long-term entrepreneurs, reporting both current and previous employment as full-time 
entrepreneurs. Turning to other variables, we observe a strong link between generosity and willingness to 
join a team as subjects who allocate more questions to the team in Stage 2 also bid significantly more to 
join a team for Stage 3. We also find a weak positive age effect and a weak negative aptitude effect. 
 
Looking at why subjects, especially entrepreneurs, don’t want to join teams, the data supports two 
possibilities. The first is guilt avoidance – subjects don’t want to join teams because they anticipate free-
riding and don’t want to feel guilty about their actions. Not joining a team serves as a form of impulse 
control for these individuals.The data is consistent with guilt avoidance providing a partial explanation for 
                                                     
5 See also Whitt and Wilson (2007). 
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subjects’ general unwillingness to join teams, but not with guilt avoidance explaining why entrepreneurs 
are particularly unwilling to be in teams. The second possibility comes from subjects’ responses to a 
question in the post-experiment survey asking why they did or did not want to join a team. Not 
surprisingly most subjects who bid negative amounts also make negative comments about joining a team. 
Many express a general aversion to teams, citing a fear of losing control or a preference for self-reliance. 
The interdependence of teammates in our experiment is minimal. Subjects don’t work together in any 
meaningful sense and having a teammate can only improve a purely self-regarding subject’s payoff.6  If 
our experiment triggers subjects’ general aversion to teams, this suggests that they have a visceral 
preference for autonomy that transcends the specific situation they face. We speculate that this visceral 
preference is stronger among individuals who are entrepreneurs, a conjecture which is weakly supported 
by the data. If this conjecture can be confirmed in future work, it suggests that a preference for autonomy 
not only encourages individuals to start a business, as the results of Reynolds and Curtin suggest, but also 
leads to them not forming a partnership in spite of the financial benefits. 
 
Given the extensive research indicating that start-up firms are more successful when the venture involves 
more than one person (Schutjens and Wever, 2000; Reynolds and White, 1997; Feeser and Willard, 1990; 
Cooper and Bruno, 1977), programs designed to encourage partnerships among entrepreneurs starting 
new businesses seem likely to improve the financial performance of new firms (although not necessarily 
improving the psychological well-being of their founders). A natural policy implication of our results is 
that any program designed to encourage entrepreneurial partnerships will be swimming upstream against 
the strong preferences of entrepreneurs. However, a closer reading of the results suggests a more nuanced 
interpretation. The aversion of entrepreneurs to team membership increases as they become more 
involved with entrepreneurship. Subjects who are 30 or younger and want to be entrepreneurs in the 
future are slightly more willing than their peers to join teams. Subjects who report being full-time 
entrepreneurs currently but not in the past are less willing than their peers to join teams, but the effect is 
weak. The subjects who are the most averse to joining teams are those who report both current and past 
experience as entrepreneurs. Our results therefore suggest that interventions designed to encourage 
entrepreneurial partnerships are more likely to succeed if aimed at novice entrepreneurs.7   
 
Our results add to a relatively new strand of the entrepreneurship literature that uses economic 
experiments to identify differences between entrepreneurs and otherwise similar individuals.8 
Experiments are best viewed as a complement to other methodologies used by researchers in 
entrepreneurship, and like all methodologies come with strengths and weaknesses. Benefits of utilizing an 
experimental approach include the following: (1) Subjects’ choices are observed in a controlled 
environment where the experimenter controls what options are available, what information the 
entrepreneur receives, and how much the entrepreneur earns subject to his decisions and the choices of 
other subjects. To understand the value of a controlled environment, consider the motivations underlying 
the decision whether or not to join a team. An individual’s desire to join a team depends both on his 
                                                     
6 A purely self-regarding individual is an individual who solely cares about maximizing their own monetary payoff. 
7 Approximately 60% of new firms are started by individuals with no previous entrepreneurial experience (Reynolds 
and Curtin, 2008). 
8 For other examples of experimental work designed to identify the psychological traits of entrepreneurs, see Elston, 
Harrison, and Rutström’s (2005, 2006) on risk attitudes and Burmeister and Schade (2007) on status quo bias. 
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preferences, such as a desire for autonomy, and his beliefs about the behavior of others.9 In field settings, 
beliefs cannot be observed, making it difficult to determine whether the likelihood of joining a team 
varies between populations because of differences in preferences or differences in beliefs. In a controlled 
environment, differences in beliefs can be limited through the use of common feedback. This allows us to 
fairly confidently identify differences in the likelihood of joining teams with differences in preferences. 
(2)  Subjects’ choices directly affect their monetary payoffs from the experiment. Many of the traits 
attibuted to entrepreneurs have been identified through non-incentivized surveys. There is debate within 
the entrepreneurship literature on the conclusiveness of studies based solely on non-incentivized surveys 
(Gartner, 1988), and substantial evidence from the experimental literature that subjects responding to 
monetary incentives make different choices than subjects responding to hypotheticals (e.g. Holt and 
Laury, 2002). In terms of our experiment, virtually everyone is willing to pay lip service to the notion that 
teamwork and cooperation are good things. It is more telling to see if people are willing to join teams and 
invest effort in teams when they have to put their money where their mouth is. (3)  The artificiality of 
experiments, often criticized as a liability, is also an asset because it allows us to put entrepreneurs in 
situations that would not naturally occur. For example, we are interested in whether entrepreneurs are 
unusually prone to moral hazard. Since most entrepreneurs do not start with partners, field data can’t 
reveal anything about their behavior in teams. Even if we restrict attention to entrepreneurs who are in 
teams, the resulting sample is highly selected. In our experiment, all subjects play with a teammate by 
design, allowing us to observe how all subjects behave when participating in team production. 
 
While we believe economic experiments are a useful tool for examining the traits of entrepreneurs, we are 
not foolish enough to believe that they are a perfect tool. Large scale surveys like the PSED allow for 
bigger and more representative samples than are possible with experiments.10   We suggest that a useful 
approach is to utilize controlled experiments with monetary payoffs and non-incentivized surveys as 
complements, taking advantage of the strengths of each approach. For example, the data reported below 
establishes that entrepreneurs are relatively averse to joining teams, indicating that this is a cause of the 
low rate of team formation in new firms. However, our study is designed to confirm the role of an 
aversion to joining teams rather than eliminating other potential explanations such as an inability to find 
suitable partners. Because the weight placed on economic factors in an entrepreneur’s decision whether to 
form a team is determined by the specific setting and incentives faced by a potential entrepreneur, field 
work that asks entrepreneurs about the specific situation they faced in forming a new firm is necessary to 
establish the relative importance of an aversion to teams versus more economic factors. 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design with a focus on 
our unusual subject population and their effect on our experimental design. Section 3 gives an overview 
of the experimental results while Section 4 gives more formal econometric analysis. Section 5 discusses 
the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 The expected payoff from joining a team is an increasing function of other team members’ expected efforts. 
Moreover, conditional cooperators will find a team more attractive if others are expected to cooperate. 
10 For example, the PSED II includes data from 1214 individuals. To run our experiment with this sample size, 
holding incentives fixed, would have cost almost $50K. 
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2. Experimental Design  
 
A) Experimental Task: We implemented team production with a real effort task rather than a 
simpler abstract setup (i.e. allocating tokens to an individual account or a team account). The use of a 
real effort task has several benefits for our purposes. Because many of our subjects are years removed 
from academia, we did not want the experiment to seem overly abstract. Using a real effort task rather 
than “tokens” makes effort concrete for the subjects. We also used the real effort task to give subjects a 
sense of ownership over their effort. Many of our subjects have incomes greater than $100K/year. We 
offered subjects generous incentives (about $40 for a half hour experiment), but were nonetheless 
concerned that the monetary stakes might not be salient for high income subjects. The results of 
Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) suggest subjects feel greater ownership over money 
generated by their effort as opposed to money they are simply given. We therefore made subjects earn 
the money being allocated to individual or team accounts as a means to increase saliency of the payoffs. 
Finally, we wanted a natural measure of ability that varied among our subjects. Having this measure lets 
us control for whether the results reflect some subjects being more able or overconfident than others. It 
also allows us to address a secondary issue of some interest, the relative willingness of high ability 
subjects to join teams. 
 
The specific task faced by subjects was answering questions drawn from the Graduate Management 
Admission Test (GMAT), the standard admissions test for business schools in the United States. All 
questions were multiple choice questions with five possible answers. We selected questions that either 
involved reasoning through business related problems or solving simple logic problems. Questions that 
involved mathematical computation were eliminated so older subjects who hadn’t taken algebra in 
decades would not feel at a disadvantage. The questions were framed in naturalistic language and should 
not have seemed overly abstract to our subjects. A sample question is shown in Figure 1 with the correct 
answer highlighted.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Sample Question: Company Alpha buys free-travel coupons from people who are awarded the 
coupons by Bravo Airlines for flying frequently on Bravo airplanes. The coupons are sold to people 
who pay less for the coupons than they would pay by purchasing tickets from Bravo. This marketing 
of coupons results in lost revenue for Bravo. To discourage the buying and selling of free-travel 
coupons, it would be best for Bravo Airlines to restrict the . . . 
  
(A) number of coupons that a person can be awarded in a particular year  
(B) use of the coupons to those who were awarded the coupons and their immediate families  
(C) days that the coupons can be used to Monday through Friday  
(D) amount of time that the coupons can be used after they are issued  
(E) number of routes on which travelers can use the coupons 
 
 
Answering GMAT questions is a good experimental task for several reasons. Answering multiple 
choice questions is a simple task that is easily implemented in an online environment, can be repeated 
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many times in a short period, and is easily explained to subjects. Virtually all Americans have taken a 
standardized test at some point, so the task is familiar. The questions are sufficiently difficult that 
subjects are unlikely to see an answer immediately without any thought, but sufficiently easy that most 
subjects should be able to complete several in a limited period of time. Even though the GMAT is used 
for business school admission, the questions are sufficiently general that business experience is only 
mildly helpful in answering them. Thus, business experience is not highly correlated with our measure 
of aptitude. 
 
To limit a potential source of variation across subjects, all individuals faced the same questions in the 
same order. Contamination across subjects through sharing of questions seems unlikely since subjects 
were geographically scattered and would not have known who the other subjects were. We checked for 
contamination by testing whether later subjects answered more questions correctly and find no effect. 
 
B) Subject Pool: A central feature of our experimental design is its diverse subject pool. Subjects for the 
main experiment came from five separate groups. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of subjects 
recruited from these groups as well as the entire subject population for the main experiment. 
 
Table 1: Subject Pool Characteristics 
 
Subject Pool Age Gender (% Female) 
Employed 
Full-Time 
High Income 
(> $100K) 
Self 
Employed11 
Jim Moran Institute 
(34 subjects) 48.5 38.2% 88.2% 44.1% 79.4% 
Full-Time COB 
(38 subjects) 27.3 55.3% 21.1% 0.0% 0% 
Part-Time COB 
(38 subjects) 33.0 31.6% 89.5% 13.2% 13.2% 
COB Alumni 
(30 subjects) 49.2 26.7% 76.7% 40.0% 26.7% 
Undergraduates 
(44 subjects) 20.9 40.9% 6.8% 2.3% 9.1% 
All Data 
(184 subjects) 34.4 38.5% 52.7% 17.4% 24.5% 
 
1) Jim Moran Institute: The Jim Moran Institute (JMI) is run by FSU’s College of Business (COB). It 
promotes entrepreneurship, providing services that include free consulting for entrepreneurs, round-
tables about entrepreneurship, and general information for individuals interested in 
entrepreneurship. Subjects recruited through JMI were our largest source of self-employed 
individuals. 
 
Several features of the JMI population played an important role in our experimental design. The 
majority of the JMI subjects live in the Tallahassee area, but more than a third of them live 
elsewhere. The geographic dispersion of JMI subjects (as well as part-time COB students and COB 
alumni) was an important factor driving our decision to use an online experiment rather than a more 
                                                     
11 This statistic reflects all individuals who report being either part or full-time self-employed. 
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traditional laboratory experiment. Incomes are relatively high for the JMI subjects (44% earn more 
than $100/K year) and time is presumably tight for them, so the experiment was designed to 
provide relatively high incentives and a short time commitment. The average subject in our main 
experiment earned $38 and the experiment only took a half hour to complete. We strictly limited 
the information we collected, to stay within a half hour time budget. To make participation as 
convenient as possible, subjects could log in and participate at any time within a two week window.  
 
An important feature of the JMI subject pool is their educational background. Unfortunately, we 
only obtained educational backgrounds for 25 of the 34 JMI subjects. Of these 25 subjects, 18 had 
only an undergraduate education, 5 had MBAs, and 2 had professional degrees from non-business 
fields. Unlike COB students and alumni, JMI subjects generally did not have a graduate business 
education. 
 
2) Full-time and Part-time COB: We sent a recruiting email to all students currently enrolled in 
professional programs at Florida State University’s College of Business (COB). These are primarily 
students in the MBA program, although we also have participants who are earning Masters in 
Accounting, MIS, or Risk Management/Insurance. As can be seen in Table 1, the full and part time 
COB students are quite different and are best considered as separate subject groups. The full-time 
students are mainly traditional MBA students taking courses on campus in Tallahassee. They are 
younger than the part-time students and generally don’t work full-time (50% of full-time COB 
students are not working at all). The part-time students mostly work full-time and are primarily in 
FSU’s on-line MBA program (22 of 37 subjects). The part-time students have higher incomes than 
the full-time students, with 62% of the part-time students reporting annual income of $50K or 
greater, as compared to only 18% of the full-time students.  
 
3) COB Alumni: We sent a recruiting email to all COB graduate alumni who graduated between 1975 
and 2004. Alumni who graduated before 1975 were excluded to avoid recruiting large numbers of 
retirees and post-2004 graduates were excluded so individuals in the alumni subject pool would 
have at least five years of work experience. As can be seen in Table 1, the COB alumni who 
participated in our experiment resemble the JMI participants along many dimensions, particularly 
age and income. There were some differences between the two groups. The alumni were more 
geographically dispersed than the JMI subjects, with less than a third living in Tallahassee. Unlike 
the JMI subjects, the alumni (by definition) all had a graduate degree in some business field.  
  
4) Undergraduates: Undergraduate subjects in the main experiment participated online like all other 
subjects in the main experiment. To reduce the likelihood of collusion among undergraduate 
subjects, we ran experiments for undergraduates during the break between the spring and first 
summer semesters, a time period when virtually no undergraduates are in Tallahassee. 
Undergraduate subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Because the experiment did 
not require subjects to be on campus, a few recent graduates whose email addresses were still in the 
system also participated. 
 
The 29 full-time entrepreneurs in our experiments are substantially different from the 15 part-time 
entrepreneurs along several dimensions, including a higher average age (48 vs. 39 years) and higher 
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likelihood of annual income over $100K (48% vs. 27%). Because of these differences we treat part-
time and full-time entrepreneurs as separate groups. Earlier studies which found behavioral differences 
between part-time and full-time entrepreneurs (Elston, Harrison, and Rutström, 2006) also helped 
persuade us to analyze the two groups separately.  
 
C) Preliminary Experiment: In measuring preferences for joining teams, an unwanted source of 
variation is subjects’ beliefs about their potential teammates. For example, undergraduates might be 
more willing to join teams than COB alumni because undergraduates have more optimistic beliefs about 
their teammates’ willingness to contribute to team production. To reduce variation in beliefs, subjects in 
the main experiment drew their teammates from a common pool of previous participants and were 
given multiple opportunities to observe extensive feedback about the behavior of individuals in this 
common pool (but not about the specific individual they were matched with) prior to making any 
decisions about joining a team. Given this common feedback, beliefs about potential teammates should 
be similar across groups in the main experiment. The preliminary experiment described in this 
subsection provided the common pool of potential teammates for the main experiment.12 
 
All subjects in the preliminary experiments were undergraduates at FSU. Subjects were recruited using 
ORSEE. Sessions were run in the xs/fs laboratory at FSU using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). There were 
60 subjects in the preliminary experiments.  
 
The preliminary experiment consisted of three stages. In the first stage, subjects had five minutes to 
answer as many GMAT questions, up to a maximum of fifteen, as possible. Prior to seeing each 
question, subjects were asked which of two accounts, Account A or Account B, they wanted to allocate 
the question to. Account A paid $2.40 per correct answer and Account B paid $1.80 per correct answer. 
Subjects were not penalized for incorrect answers, regardless of which account was chosen. This two 
account structure was used in the first stage to maintain parallelism with later stages where there was a 
team account, but there was no reason for a subject to choose Account B in the first stage. After 
choosing an account, subjects were shown the question and could take as much time as they wanted to 
choose an answer. The same question was shown regardless of which account had been selected. 
Subjects received no feedback about their performance while the stage was ongoing. Once the stage 
was completed, the subjects received feedback about how many questions they had allocated to each 
account, how many of the questions allocated to each account had been answered correctly, and their 
total earnings from each account. The subjects were also shown the average number of questions 
allocated to each account and the average number of correct questions for each account across all 
individuals in their session.  
 
Stage 2 of the preliminary experiment was the same as Stage 1, except subjects were randomly paired 
with a partner from a future session. Subjects were explicitly told that their teammate would not be 
playing until later and that payoffs from Stages 2 and 3 would not occur until a later date. Once again, 
prior to seeing each question the subjects chose to allocate it to either Account A or Account B. 
Account A remained a private account that paid $2.40 per correct answer. Account B was now a team 
account that paid $3.60 per correct answer, split evenly between the two teammates. The individual 
                                                     
12 We considered eliciting beliefs and then controlling for beliefs in the regression analysis, but decided against this 
due to concerns with the time involved as well as the possibility of affecting subject behavior (Croson, 2000). 
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payoff from Account B was $1.80, the same as in Stage 1, yielding an MPCR of .75. Subjects did not 
know whether their teammate was contributing questions to Account A or Account B while Stage 2 was 
ongoing and received no feedback after the stage about their teammate’s choices (giving subjects 
information about their teammate’s choices would have required time travel). The feedback following 
Stage 2 showed the same information, based on the choices of other subjects in their session, as the 
feedback after Stage 1. 
 
A central problem in real effort experiments is loss of control over incentives since the ability of 
subjects to complete the task is unknown ex ante. Use of a two account design with identical questions 
allows us to precisely control the MPCR within a real-effort experiment. Regardless of how good or 
bad subjects are at solving GMAT questions, the expected monetary payoff from allocating a question 
to Account B is 75% of the expected monetary payoff from Account A.13 
 
For Stage 3, subjects were randomly matched with a new future teammate. Stage 3 was then conducted 
in a manner identical to Stage 2. At the conclusion of the session, subjects in the preliminary 
experiments were paid their $10 show-up fee as well as their payoff for Stage 1. They were given a date 
to pick up additional payments for Stages 2 and 3. We followed this up with an email reminding 
subjects that their payments for Stages 2 and 3 were available. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the data from the preliminary sessions. Data from the preliminary sessions are not 
included in any of the results reported in Section 4. In Stage 1, subjects correctly allocate almost all 
questions to Account A. In Stage 2, 37% of the questions were allocated to Account B, the team 
account. This dropped to 28% in Stage 3 following the pattern of declining contributions typically 
observed in public goods experiments. The number of questions attempted rose over the three stages 
while the percentage of correct answers fell. These changes reflect a group of subjects (20% of the 
subject pool) who learned to take advantage of the lack of penalty for getting questions wrong by 
quickly guessing on all remaining questions toward the end of the five minute period. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Preliminary Experiment Results 
 
Stage Correct Account A 
Attempted 
Account A 
Correct 
Account B 
Attempted 
Account B 
1 2.57 6.18 0.15 0.42 
2 1.82 5.17 1.12 3.05 
3 1.95 6.22 0.75 2.44 
 
D) Main Experiment: All subjects in the main experiment participated via the internet using zTree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Screenshots of the experiment, including all instructions, are available in the 
online appendix to this paper.14 Potential subjects received a recruiting email that provided a brief 
description of the research project, links to information about us and the Florida State experimental 
group (to ease subject concerns about online fraud), and a link to a website where they could participate 
                                                     
13 See van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001) for a similar approach in a real effort experiment studying 
incentive systems.  
14 Online appendix located at: http://myweb.fsu.edu/djcooper/research/entrepreneurteamsappendix.pdf 
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in the experiment. The website contained a link for downloading z-leaf, along with installation 
instructions. When the subjects started zLeaf, they were automatically connected to our zTree server in 
Tallahassee to run the experiment. Subjects could (and did) call us for help with installing and running 
the software. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to provide a mailing address for 
payment. We mailed a check for their full earnings to this address within two weeks of their completion 
of the experiment. Average payment was $38.17. 
 
Subjects were instructed to conduct the experiment “by yourself in a quiet location.” We suggested that 
they should do the experiment in the evening at home. Although subjects could participate at any time 
they wanted within a two week window, most followed our instructions and participated in the evening. 
We have no way of knowing where the subjects were when they participated, what other websites they 
may have logged onto, or whether they were alone. The number of questions answered correctly in 
Stage 1 for undergraduates in the lab and undergraduates participating online do not differ significantly, 
suggesting that online participants were not receiving assistance with answering the questions. There 
are obvious concerns with running experiments online, but we feel that the benefits of gaining access to 
subjects who would otherwise be unlikely to participate outweigh the methodological costs.  
 
The main experiment has a three stage design inspired by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Stages 1 and 
2 of the main experiment were identical to Stages 1 and 2 in the preliminary experiment, except that the 
teammate in Stage 2 was a previous participant, drawn from the preliminary experiment. Subjects in the 
main experiment knew that their teammates were previous participants, but were not given specific 
information about the identity of subjects in the preliminary experiment. The instructions made it clear 
to subjects in the main experiment that their teammates played under the same rules as them and would 
be paid for any contributions to the team account. Subjects in the main experiment were given no 
specific information about the choices of their teammates either while the game was in progress or 
after. They instead received feedback at the end of Stages 1 and 2 about the average choices of all 
individuals in the preliminary experiment, identified as the pool of potential teammates. This feedback 
included the average number of questions allocated to each account and the average number of correct 
answers for each account. Giving all subjects in the main experiment identical feedback about potential 
teammates after Stages 1 and 2 is designed to reduce differences in beliefs about potential teammates. 
 
Prior to Stage 3 of the main experiment, a BDM mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) 
determined whether subjects participated individually as in Stage 1 or in a team as in Stage 2. Subjects 
were instructed that their potential teammate would be a previous participant, but not the same person 
they were partnered with for Stage 2. Subjects knew that, unlike them, their potential teammates did not 
have a choice about whether they were members of a team. Without this information, sophisticated 
subjects might have adjusted their beliefs to reflect selection into the pool of potential teammates, 
reducing the likelihood of common beliefs.  
 
Getting into the specifics of the BDM mechanism, subjects were initially asked whether they preferred 
to participate in Stage 3 as an individual or in a team. This preference was used solely to frame the 
BDM, so positive numbers correspond to the subject’s preferred option. Subjects were then asked to 
submit the highest price they would be willing to pay to join a team. Admissible prices ranged between 
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-$10 and $10.15 Our use of negative prices is somewhat unusual – if a subject chooses a negative price, 
this indicates that they would have to be paid to join a team. After the subject submitted their 
willingness to pay to join a team, a random number was drawn from a uniform distribution over the 
range between -$10 and $10. If the number drawn was smaller than the subject’s bid, they were 
assigned a partner for Stage 3 and paid the amount drawn. If the price drawn was a negative number, 
we paid the subject to join a team. If the number drawn was greater than the subject’s bid, they played 
Stage 3 as an individual and paid (or received) nothing. The procedures for Stage 3 were identical to 
those used in Stage 1 for subjects participating as individuals and Stage 2 for subjects in teams. 
 
The BDM makes it a dominant strategy for utility maximizing subjects to submit their true willingness 
to pay to join a team. Given the payoff structure in our experiments, for a purely self-regarding 
individual (i.e. an individual who solely cares about maximizing their own monetary payoff) it is also a 
weakly dominated strategy to submit a negative bid. The individual account pays the same amount 
whether a subject is in a team or not, so a purely self-regarding subject can always join a team, 
contribute all questions to the individual account, and still receive payment from any questions their 
partner contributes to the team account. Subjects received detailed instructions on the BDM which 
stressed that it was to their benefit to bid their true maximum willingness to pay to join a team. Subjects 
were given multiple examples illustrating how the mechanism works and the perils of not bidding their 
true willingness to pay for joining a team. Nonetheless, it is well-known that the BDM can yield biased 
valuations.16 The same mechanism was used for all subjects in our experiments, so any bias should not 
affect our conclusions unless it differs systematically across different types of subjects. The results 
section presents evidence that our conclusions are not driven by use of the BDM.17 
 
After Stage 3 was completed, we elicited risk preferences using a mechanism adapted from Eckel and 
Grossman (2008).18 Subjects were offered a choice between five binary gambles. The outcome for their 
chosen gamble was determined after the experiment was over and the resulting payoff, ranging between 
$0.10 and $3.25, was added to their earnings for the experiment. The five gambles are constructed so 
that both expected value and risk (standard deviation of payoffs) are increasing in the order of gambles. 
Choosing a higher gamble therefore corresponds to lower risk aversion. To make the mechanism easier 
for subjects to understand, all probabilities were 50/50, gambles were framed in terms of flipping a 
coin, and subjects were given a visual representation of the payoffs along with the numeric values.  
 
Also after Stage 3, we elicited a measure of subjects’ overconfidence by asking them to compare their 
ability to answer questions with other subjects from their subject group (rather than subjects in the 
preliminary experiment). For example, COB students were asked “We would like to ask you how you 
believe your performance on questions in Stage 2 ranks against other masters students from the FSU 
College of Business.” Subjects were asked to choose what quartile their performance fell into. They 
                                                     
15 The maximum and minimum bids were set to be slightly larger than average earnings from a stage, which were 
$7.67 for Stage 1 and $9.35 for Stage 2. Only 11 of 184 bids were on one of the two boundaries. 
16 See Bardsley, Cubitt, Loomes, Moffatt, Starmer, and Sugden (pp. 271-4, 2009) for a recent summary of 
methodological issues surrounding the BDM. 
17 We experimented with modifications to the wording and mechanism designed to simplify the task for subjects. 
None of the simplifications affected subject behavior. 
18 We’d like to thank Tim Salmon for sharing his adaptation of the Eckel-Grossman mechanism, used in 
Macpherson, Prasad, and Salmon (2009). 
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were paid an additional $2 if their choice was correct. On average our subjects were overconfident, with 
54% overestimating the quartile their performance fell into as compared to only 14% who 
underestimated their performance.  
 
The experiment ended with subjects filling out a survey about their demographic characteristics and 
employment history, particularly self-employment. A copy of the survey given to COB alumni is in the 
online appendix. We limited the survey to a single screen to increase the likelihood that subjects would 
answer the questions. This reduced the number of questions we could ask, but we succeeded in having 
almost all subjects fill out the entire survey. The income question was categorical, so we only know a 
range for the subjects’ self-reported incomes. The survey also included a text box where subjects were 
asked to tell why they did or did not want to participate as part of a team. 
 
3. Results of the Main Experiment: Table 3 gives an overview of the data from the main experiment 
that parallels the information provided for the preliminary experiment in Table 2. Comparing 
undergrads with undergrads, the average number of questions answered correctly in Stage 1 is almost 
identical in the main and preliminary experiments (2.90 vs. 2.72), implying that subjects who 
participated online were not receiving outside assistance. As in the preliminary experiment, the number 
of questions attempted rose over time while the percentage of questions answered correctly fell over 
time. This once again reflects a subset of the subjects (18% of the subjects) who gamed the system by 
quickly guessing answers at the end of the five minute period.  
 
Table 3: Summary of Main Experiment Results 
 
Stage Correct Account A 
Attempted 
Account A 
Correct 
Account B 
Attempted 
Account B 
1 3.00 5.81 0.20 0.42 
2 1.90 4.13 1.54 3.74 
3 (Individual) 3.02 8.33 0.19 0.47 
3 (Team) 1.63 4.09 1.24 3.49 
 
In Stage 2, 48% of questions were allocated to Account B. Comparing undergraduates with 
undergraduates, slightly more questions were allocated to Account B in the preliminary experiment 
(37%) than in the main experiment (31%). This difference is not statistically significant. For subjects 
assigned to teams in Stage 3, the proportion of questions allocated to Account B is 47%. Allocations to 
the team account are decreasing (as expected) since subjects who were assigned to teams in Stage 3 
allocated 59% of their questions to Account B in Stage 2.  
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of allocations to the team account in Stage 2. An observation in this 
figure is the proportion of questions allocated to the team account by a single subject. 90% of the 
subjects attempted at least five questions, providing them with ample opportunity to mix their 
allocations between the two accounts. The population divides roughly into thirds, with 28% of the 
subjects allocating all questions to the individual account in Stage 2, 29% allocating all questions to the 
team account, and the remaining 43% allocating at least one question to each of the accounts. The 
median subject allocated 54% of their questions to the team account.  
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We identify subjects as entrepreneurs if they report being self-employed in the post-experiment survey. 
Self-employment is an imperfect proxy for entrepreneurship, but since there isn’t universal agreement on 
the definition of an entrepreneur (Reynolds and Curtin, 2007) it isn’t obvious that a better proxy exists. 
Self-employment has commonly been used as a proxy for being an entrepreneur in the empirical literature 
on entrepreneurship (e.g. Evans and Leighton, 1989; Hamilton, 2000; Fairlie, 2005) and was also used to 
screen and identify entrepreneurs for the PSED II. Space was extremely limited on the post-experiment 
survey, and using self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurship makes it straight-forward to identify 
subjects as entrepreneurs (according to this definition) with a single question. 
 
 
 
Comparing entrepreneurs directly with the rest of the experimental population isn’t very useful because 
there is so much variation on dimensions other than self-employment status. Section 4 uses regressions 
to identify the effects of being an entrepreneur, controlling for subjects’ other characteristics, but the 
current section tries to give an intuitive feel for the data with less formal analysis. To do this while 
somewhat controlling for other sources of variation, we take advantage of the fact that virtually all of 
the full-time entrepreneurs (28 of 29) in our subject pool are older than 30. This is germane because 
there are strong age effects in our data on allocating questions to the team account, echoing the age 
effects observed by Charness and Villeval (2009). Figure 3 illustrates this, breaking down the subject 
pool by decade cohorts. There is an obvious jump in the proportion of questions allocated to the team 
account in Stage 2 for subjects older than 30, after which there is no clear relationship between age and 
20
%
0%
10
%
30
%
40
%
%
 P
op
ul
at
io
n
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
% Allocated to Team Account -- Stage 2
Figure 2:  Distribution of Proportion Allocated to Team Account
14 
 
allocation to the team account.19 We therefore consider differences between full-time entrepreneurs and 
the rest of the subject pool for both the full dataset and for the dataset restricted to subjects older than 
30. This restriction controls (roughly) for the strong age effect in the data while discarding almost no 
observations from full-time entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 compares the percentage of questions allocated to the team account for subjects who are full-
time entrepreneurs and subjects who are not. Because there are relatively few subjects who are part-
time entrepreneurs – only nine in the older than 30 population – Figure 4 pools the part-time 
entrepreneurs with the subjects who are not entrepreneurs at all. The regression analysis in Section 4 
uses the full dataset and controls for subjects who are part-time entrepreneurs. This more careful 
approach does not change any of our conclusions about full-time entrepreneurs. The left cluster of bars 
in Figure 4 is based on data from the entire population, while the right cluster limits the sample to 
subjects older than 30. Looking at the entire population, full-time entrepreneurs allocate more questions 
to the team account than other subjects. This difference vanishes when the comparison is based solely 
on subjects older than 30, indicating that the apparent effect is due to the relative age of full-time 
entrepreneurs. 
 
                                                     
19 Regression analysis, discussed in Section 4, indicates that neither the dip for subjects in their 50s or the increase 
for those in their 60s is statistically significant.  
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Regularity 1: Controlling for age, subjects who are full-time entrepreneurs allocate questions to the 
team account in Stage 2 at the same rate as other subjects.  
 
 
 
We now arrive at the central question of the paper: are entrepreneurs less willing to join teams?  Figure 
5 shows the distribution of bids to join a team for the entire population. Recall that possible bids range 
between -$10 and $10, with negative bids indicating a preference for playing as an individual. The 
mean bid is slightly negative (-$0.29) and the distribution is quite spread out (StD = $4.75). About half 
of the subjects (54%) submitted a negative bid, even though this is weakly dominated for purely self-
regarding subjects. 
 
There are many large bids, with 23% of bids having an absolute value greater than $5.00. Given that the 
average payoff for Stage 3 (not including any payments or receipts for joining a team) was only $7.55,20 
the prevalence of large bids must reflect some combination of very strong feelings about playing in 
teams and subject confusion. Realistically, it is hard to imagine that confusion doesn’t play a role, so 
Sections 3 and 4 examine whether the effect of being a full-time entrepreneur can be explained by 
subject confusion.  
 
                                                     
20 Average Stage 3 payoffs are about the same for subjects who have a bid with an absolute value greater than $5 
and those who make smaller bids ($7.25 vs. $7.64). 
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Figure 6 compares the average bid to participate in a team by subjects who are full-time entrepreneurs 
and subjects who are not. Once again, part-time entrepreneurs are pooled with subjects who are not 
entrepreneurs. The left hand cluster of bars is based on data from the entire population while the right 
hand cluster only uses data from subjects older than 30 – there are also age effects in the bids to 
participate in a team (see Section 4). Even looking at the full population there is an obvious effect from 
being a full-time entrepreneur, as full-time entrepreneurs bid $0.97 less (on average) to be in a team 
than other subjects. Limiting the population to subjects who are older than 30 makes the effect more 
obvious, increasing the difference between full-time entrepreneurs and others to $1.70. This difference 
in average bids is large. A difference of $1.70 represents 39% of the average absolute value of bids for 
subjects older than 30 ($4.34) and 25% of the average Stage 3 payoff for subjects older than 30 ($6.70). 
 
The lower willingness of full-time entrepreneurs to join teams cannot be explained by subject confusion 
about the BDM mechanism. One likely sign of confusion about the BDM is use of unusually large bids, 
but bids with an absolute value greater than $5 are slightly less frequent for full-time entrepreneurs 
(25%) than for other subjects older than 30 (32%). Even if subjects are confused about the BDM 
mechanism, it seems unlikely that they would be confused about the meaning of the sign of their bid. 
Only 32% of full-time entrepreneurs bid strictly positive amounts to join a team for Stage 3, as 
compared with 48% of all other subjects older than 30. Therefore, measuring willingness to join teams 
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in a way that doesn’t rely on the details of the BDM mechanism also shows lower interest in teams for 
full-time entrepreneurs.  
 
 
 
The preceding analysis focuses on whether subjects are currently entrepreneurs, but we also have 
survey data on whether subjects were previously entrepreneurs. By itself, having been a full-time 
entrepreneur previously is not associated with lower willingness to join a team. Among subjects older 
than 30, subjects who are not currently full-time entrepreneurs, but were in the past, actually bid 
slightly more on average to be in a team ($1.09) than subjects who have never been full-time 
entrepreneurs ($0.67). However, the seventeen subjects who report both currently and previously being 
full-time entrepreneurs are extremely reluctant to join teams with an average bid of -$2.49, compared 
with an average bid of $1.38 for subjects who are currently full-time entrepreneurs but were not 
previously. More rigorous statistical analysis, controlling for other subject characteristics, indicates that 
subjects with any experience as full-time entrepreneurs, current or past, are less willing to join teams, 
but the effect is only large (and statistically significant) for those who report both currently and 
previously being full-time entrepreneurs. See Section 4 for details. The negative effect of being a full-
time entrepreneur on willingness to join teams is largely due to subjects that report being long-term 
entrepreneurs, suggesting that increased experience as an entrepreneur is correlated with an increased 
aversion to joining teams.  
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Desire to be a full-time entrepreneur in the future does not predict willingness to join a team. Consider 
subjects who are 30 or younger, full-time students (either undergraduates or COB students), and have 
no current or past experience with being full-time entrepreneurs. The survey asked these individuals if 
they would like to be self-employed full-time in the future. Subjects who answer that they would like to 
be full-time entrepreneurs in the future bid slightly more on average to join a team ($0.06) than other 
subjects in this population (-$0.29). Something about being an entrepreneur, rather than the mere desire 
to be an entrepreneur, must explain the relative unwillingness of entrepreneurs to join a team. 
 
Regularity 2: Subjects who are full-time entrepreneurs bid less to join a team for Stage 3 than other 
subjects. This effect is driven by the subset of subjects who are both currently and previously full-time 
entrepreneurs. Among younger subjects, a desire to be a full-time entrepreneur is not associated with 
lower willingness to join a team. 
 
4. Regression Analysis: The preceding analysis suggests that full-time entrepreneurs are less willing to 
join teams than other subjects, but are equally willing to allocate effort to team production when forced 
to join a team. However, subjects vary on many dimensions beyond being entrepreneurs. Figure 3 
shows that there are strong age effects in the data, and it is easy to imagine that factors such as gender, 
income, and aptitude for the task could also affect behavior. We therefore use regressions to separate 
the impact of being an entrepreneur from the effects of other subject characteristics. 
 
The two variables used as dependent variables in our regressions are the proportion of questions allocated 
to the team account in Stage 2 and the bid to join a team in Stage 3. A tobit specification is used in both 
cases since both variables are censored. All statements about statistical significance are based on robust 
standard errors. 
 
All regressions on Table 4 include dummies for the subject pool the individual was drawn from. In 
Models 1 and 2, the regressions where the proportion of questions allocated to the team is the dependent 
variable, these four dummies are neither individually nor jointly significant. In contrast, the four subject 
pool dummies are jointly significant at the 5% level in Models 3 and 4 where the dependent variable is 
the bid to join a team. Examining individual parameter estimates yields a clear pattern. The three groups 
of COB students (part-time, full-time, alumni) form one cluster. An F-test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that these three parameter estimates are equal to each other (F-stat = 1.09; p =0.34). Both 
undergraduates and JMI subjects bid more than any group of COB students to join teams and do not 
differ significantly from each other (t-stat = 1.24; p = 0.22). If the four subject pool dummies are 
replaced with a single dummy for the three groups of COB students, the resulting parameter estimate is 
large (-$2.45) and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 2.88; p < .01). Comparing the two 
models, the improvement in statistical fit from adding subject pool dummies (as opposed to a single 
dummy for COB students) fails to achieve significance at the 10% level (F-stat = 1.64; p = .18). Given 
that few of the JMI subjects had business school degrees, it seems probable that the subject pool 
dummies primarily capture an effect associated with a business-school background, either a direct effect 
of experiences from business school or a selection effect. Our conclusions are unchanged if the model 
with a single dummy for COB students is used rather than the model with subject pool dummies. 
Parameter estimates for the subject pool dummies are suppressed in Table 4 to save space. 
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Table 4: Tobit Regressions 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable Allocation  to Team 
Allocation  
to Team 
Bid to be  
in Team 
Bid to be  
in Team 
Part-time Entrepreneur .560
**
(.272) 
.611**
(.277) 
-0.40 
(1.15) 
-0.90 
(1.17) 
Full-time Entrepreneur .190 (.283) 
.217 
(.280) 
-4.15*** 
(1.42) 
-4.08***
(1.32) 
Age > 30 .642
***
(.223) 
.543**
(.221) 
2.29** 
(1.12) 
1.25 
(1.19) 
Gender 
(0 = Male, 1 = Female) 
.076 
(.140) 
.069 
(.140) 
0.84 
(0.74) 
0.83 
(0.71) 
Income ≥ $50,000 -.051 (.179) 
-.012 
(.179) 
-0.36 
(1.00) 
-0.12 
(0.94) 
Income ≥ $100,000 -.410
*
(.212) 
-.342
(.208) 
-0.83 
(1.22) 
-0.21 
(1.19) 
Stage 1 
Number of Correct Answers  
-.090**
(.040)  
-.365*
(.195) 
Risk Measure 
(1 – 5, increasing risk)  
.001 
(.039)  
.327 
(.203) 
Over-confidence  -.005 (.063)  
0.05 
(.346) 
Stage 2 
% Allocated to Team    
2.25**
(0.91) 
Log-likelihood -180.96 -178.04 -527.50 -521.26 
 
All regressions on Table 4 include 184 observations. The numbers reported in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. Parameter estimates for the subject group dummies and a dummy for 
observations missing a value for income have been suppressed in this table. 
 
The independent variables that appear in Table 4 are the following: 
 
1) Entrepreneur: All regressions include a dummy for subjects who report being a part-time 
entrepreneur and a dummy for subjects who report being a full-time entrepreneur. As discussed 
previously, we use self-employment as a proxy for being an entrepreneur. 
 
2) Age: All regressions include a dummy for subjects older than 30. In an alternative specification we 
included four dummies for the decade cohorts, as shown in Figure 3, but these finer controls for age 
effects did not significantly improve the fit.  
 
3) Gender: All regressions include a gender dummy, coded as 0 for men and 1 for women. 
 
4) Income: All regressions include a dummy for subjects with incomes in the $50K/year to $100K/year 
range and a dummy for subjects with income greater than $100K/year. Using finer partitions of the 
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subjects’ annual incomes does not significantly improve the fit. There are six observations where 
subjects declined to report an income (all survey questions gave subjects the option of “no response”). 
All regressions include a dummy for missing income. This dummy is never statistically significant and 
is suppressed in Table 4.  
 
5) Aptitude: Models 2 and 4 use the number of questions answered correctly in Stage 1 as a measure of 
aptitude. Specifications that control for the number of questions attempted (to control for subjects who 
start rapidly guessing at the end of the five minute stage) or the number of questions answered correctly 
in Stage 2 do not significantly improve the fit or change our conclusions.  
 
6) Risk Attitude: Models 2 and 4 use the gamble chosen in the Eckel-Grossman mechanism as a 
measure of risk attitude. Lower numbers correspond to higher risk aversion.  
 
7) Overconfidence: Models 2 and 4 use the difference between subjects’ stated and actual quartiles of 
questions answered correctly in Stage 2 as a measure of overconfidence. Higher numbers correspond to 
higher overconfidence. 
 
8) Allocation to Team Account: Model 4 includes the percent of questions allocated to the team account 
in Stage 2 as a control variable. This is a good predictor of how much subjects are likely to contribute to 
the team account in Stage 3 if assigned to a team.  
 
Models 1 and 2 study subjects’ willingness to allocate questions to the team account in Stage 2. Model 
1 includes controls for subject characteristics and Model 2 adds controls for behavioral measures from 
the experiment (aptitude for the task, risk attitude, and overconfidence). In both models, entrepreneurs 
are estimated to allocate more questions to the team account. This effect is stronger and statistically 
significant at the 5% level for part-time entrepreneurs.  
 
Consistent with our observations from Figure 3, a strong positive age effect is observed with the 
dummy for subjects older than 30 being statistically significant at least at the 5% level in both models. 
A weak income effect is observed with subjects in the highest income class allocating fewer questions 
to the team account. The magnitude of this effect is large but it barely achieves statistical significance at 
the 10% level. Looking at the behavioral measures in Model 2, there is a strong negative relationship 
between aptitude for the task, measured by the number of questions answered correctly in Stage 1, and 
the proportion of questions allocated to the team account. This effect is statistically significant at the 
5% level. Intuitively, the (expected) monetary loss from allocating questions to the team account is an 
increasing function of aptitude. If there is a fixed benefit from “warm glow,” then the allocation rate 
should decrease in aptitude as observed.  
 
Regularity 3: The regression analysis finds a strong positive effect on allocations to the team account in 
Stage 2 for part-time entrepreneurs.  
 
Models 3 and 4 examine subjects’ bids to join a team in Stage 3. Model 3 includes controls for subject 
characteristics and Model 4 adds controls for behavioral measures from the experiment (aptitude for the 
task, risk attitude, overconfidence, and allocations to the team account in Stage 2). Part-time 
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entrepreneurs differ little from subjects who are not entrepreneurs, but the parameter estimate for 
subjects who are full-time entrepreneurs is large, negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level in 
both models. Because the latter finding is the central result of our paper, we have run a number of 
robustness checks. First, we reran Model 3, only including subjects who are over 30. This provides a 
stronger control for any age effects. The parameter estimate for full-time entrepreneurs is slightly 
reduced but remains statistically significant at the 5% level. Second, we ran a probit with a dummy for 
strictly negative bids as the dependent variable and the same independent variable as Model 3. This 
provides a more formal check of whether the effect can be attributed to subject confusion about the 
BDM mechanism. The estimated parameter for full-time entrepreneurs is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
Section 3 noted that the effect of currently being a full-time entrepreneur on willingness to join a team 
was largest for subjects who also report having been a full-time entrepreneur previously. To determine 
whether this observation is robust to controls for other subject characteristics, we ran a version of 
Model 3 that replaces the dummy for being a full-time entrepreneur currently with three dummies for 
subjects who were full-time entrepreneurs previously but are not currently, subjects who are full-time 
entrepreneurs currently but not previously, and subjects who report being full-time entrepreneurs both 
currently and previously. The base is subjects who have never been entrepreneurs. The parameter 
estimates for these three variables are -$1.52, -$2.17, and -6.70, respectively, with standard errors of 
1.93, 1.45, and 1.98. The first two estimates are not statistically significant, while the third is significant 
at the 1% level. The difference between the estimates for subjects who are only currently full-time 
entrepreneurs and subjects who report being full-time entrepreneurs both currently and previously is 
significant at the 5% level. While any experience as a full-time entrepreneur is negatively associated 
with willingness to join teams, the strong negative effect of currently being a full-time entrepreneur on 
bids to join a team is driven primarily by the current full-time entrepreneurs who also report having 
been full-time entrepreneurs in the past. 
 
Turning to secondary issues, Model 4 shows a negative relationship, albeit weak, between bids and 
aptitude for the task, measured by the number of questions answered correctly in Stage 1. We 
hypothesize that this reflects the relatively high costs of contributing questions to the team account for 
high aptitude subjects.21 There is a strong positive relationship between allocating questions to the team 
account in Stage 2 and bids to join a team in Stage 3. The reduction of age effects between Models 3 
and 4 is due to the addition of a control for Stage 2 allocations to the team. 
 
Regularity 4: The regression analysis finds a strong, robust negative relationship between being a full-
time entrepreneur and bids to join a team in Stage 3. Regression analysis confirms that this effect is 
largely driven by subjects who report being a full-time entrepreneur both currently and previously. 
 
5. Discussion of Results: The main result of our experiment is that subjects who are full-time 
entrepreneurs are far less willing to join teams for Stage 3, as indicated by substantially lower bids. The 
                                                     
21 Intuitively, utility includes both monetary payoffs and non-pecuniary elements, such as warm glow from 
allocating questions to the team account and greater autonomy by not joining a team. For subjects who plan on 
allocating some questions to the team, increasing the cost of allocating questions to the team account makes joining 
a team less attractive from a monetary point of view without necessarily affecting the non-pecuniary elements. 
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obvious question is why these entrepreneurs are less willing to join teams, raising the broader question 
of why subjects in general might not want to join teams. Being unwilling to join a team is quite 
different from not allocating questions to the team subject to being in a team. If a subject is purely self-
regarding, he should never allocate questions to the team account but should always bid a (weakly) 
positive amount to join a team since he can benefit from free-riding. Strictly negative bids must 
therefore either be driven by subject confusion or some feature of subject preferences beyond pure 
selfishness. 
 
Subject confusion doubtlessly affected the magnitude of some bids and possibly even led to some of the 
strictly negative bids. However, several features of the data make it appear unlikely that subject 
confusion is the primary explanation for strictly negative bids. Subjects that allocate no questions to the 
team account in Stage 2 are displaying behavior completely consistent with rational behavior by a self-
regarding individual, but 67% of these subjects submit strictly negative bids to join a team for Stage 3. 
It seems implausible that these subjects who do well at maximizing their monetary payoffs in Stage 2 
have suddenly become confused and unable to maximize their monetary payoffs prior to Stage 3. Along 
similar lines, high aptitude subjects are more likely to submit strictly negative bids. 66% of the subjects 
who answered strictly more than the median number of questions in Stage 1 submitted strictly negative 
bids, compared with only 46% for subjects at or below the median. It is difficult to come up with an 
argument for why subjects who are doing particularly well in Stage 1 are exceptionally confused prior 
to Stage 3. The simplest explanation for the preceding observations is that something beyond confusion 
plays an important role in generating strictly negative bids.  
 
One possibility is that subjects try to avoid teams to prevent feeling guilty. Suppose a subject knows 
that they will free-ride if they join a team. He may anticipate feeling guilty about this greedy behavior, 
but may also anticipate being unable to control himself. Bidding a strictly negative amount serves as a 
self-commitment device, helping the subject avoid the possibility of joining a team, taking a greedy 
action, and then feeling guilty. The data provides several pieces of indirect evidence for the role of guilt 
avoidance. Recall that subjects who didn’t allocate any questions to the team in Stage 2 were 
particularly likely to submit strictly negative bids. These subjects had good reason to believe they 
would be greedy if assigned to a team for Stage 3, and their tendency to bid strictly negative amounts is 
consistent with trying to avoid the guilt associated with uncontrollable greed. Likewise, consider 
subjects who submitted strictly negative bids but were assigned to teams by the BDM mechanism. 
These subjects decreased their proportion of questions allocated to the team account from 51% in Stage 
2 to 27% in Stage 3, a much larger change than the decrease from 70% to 63% for subjects with weakly 
positive bids assigned to teams for Stage 3. Judging by their subsequent choices, subjects who revealed 
a desire to avoid playing in a team (by submitting a strictly negative bid) had good reason to believe 
that they would behave in a guilt-inducing fashion during Stage 3. This is not direct evidence of guilt 
avoidance, but is consistent with this hypothesis.22 
 
Guilt avoidance may play an important role in driving subjects to not want to join teams for Stage 3, but 
doesn’t provide a compelling explanation for full-time entrepreneurs being more averse to join teams 
                                                     
22 Another possible explanation for strictly negative bids is that subjects bid strictly negative amounts because they 
did not want to feel obligated to contribute to the team account. Given that subjects who submit strictly negative 
bids allocate very little to the team account in Stage 3, this explanation seems unlikely. 
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than other subjects. First, full-time entrepreneurs are no less likely than others to contribute to team 
accounts. As documented above, they allocate about the same proportion of questions to the team 
account in Stage 2 as other subjects older than 30. Full time entrepreneurs assigned to teams for Stage 3 
actually allocate more questions to their team in Stage 3 (81%) than other subjects older than 30 (67%), 
although this difference is not statistically significant. Second, the relationship between allocations to 
the team account in Stage 2 and bids to join a team in Stage 3 is no different for full-time entrepreneurs 
than for other subjects older than 30.23 Combining these observations, full-time entrepreneurs have no 
reason to feel unusually guilty and are no more likely to cut their bids when they do have reason to feel 
guilty. 
 
Another reason subjects might avoid teams is that they dislike the loss of control team play involves (or 
put more positively, subjects like the autonomy of playing as an individual). In the post-experiment 
survey subjects were asked why they did or did not wish to join teams. Not surprisingly, many subjects 
who submit strictly negative bids also make negative comments about joining teams. It is common for 
them to cite a fear of losing control or a preference for self-reliance, as in the following examples: 
 
“I don't want my payoff dependent on someone else's responses.” 
“I rather rely on myself.” 
“I like being able to control my own path. I don’t like being dependent on others.” 
 
It seems unlikely that these fears of losing control were reasoned responses to the experimental 
environment. The pairs that subjects join are only teams in a very minimal sense. Teammates cannot 
communicate, do not need to complete a task together, and in fact do not directly interact in any way. 
By allocating all their questions to the individual account, a purely self-regarding subject could 
guarantee that having a teammate could only help them financially. We instead suspect that comments 
like the preceding reflect a strong visceral dislike of teams and the associated lack of control, possibly 
reflecting subjects’ negative experiences in field settings.  
 
The data provides weak evidence that visceral dislike of being in teams explains the relatively strong 
aversion of full-time entrepreneurs to joining teams. Restricting the data to subjects older than 30, full-
time entrepreneurs make more negative comments about teams than other subjects (57% vs. 48%). We 
have classified which comments express a visceral dislike of teams. We tried to be conservative in 
coding this category, but it remains a highly subjective exercise. Keeping this caveat in mind, negative 
comments from full-time entrepreneurs were more likely to express a visceral preference for not joining 
a team (31% vs. 23%). We conjecture that the experience of being an entrepreneur gives individuals a 
taste for autonomy, a conjecture we hope to confirm in future projects that directly explore subjects’ 
motivations for wanting to join (or avoid) teams. A central feature of these projects will be inclusion of 
a longitudinal element so we can track how preferences change with entrepreneurial experience. 
 
Evidence from the post-experiment survey must be interpreted cautiously since subjects were not 
required to fill in the text box and no financial incentives were involved. Almost all of the subjects (177 
                                                     
23 To reach this conclusion, we modified Model 4 by including interaction terms between the proportion allocated to 
the team account in Stage 2 and dummies for being older than 30 and being a full-time entrepreneur. The parameter 
estimates for these two terms are $3.22 and $1.38 with standard errors of 1.97 and 2.33 respectively. 
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of 184) made some comment in the text box, but many of the comments were brief and some topics 
were notable for never being mentioned. In particular, guilt avoidance never came up in the comments 
about why subjects didn’t want to join a team. This doesn’t necessarily imply that guilt avoidance is 
absent in our population. If subjects are embarrassed by their greed, they may not want to admit to the 
experimenter that they avoided joining a team to constrain their own greedy behavior. We suspect that 
comments about avoiding teams to prevent a loss of control, like those quoted above, reflect subjects’ 
true feelings. There is nothing obviously embarrassing about these statements and nothing to be gained 
by lying about a desire for autonomy. However, our survey likely understates the fraction of subjects 
who were motivated by desires for control and/or autonomy as well as completely missing motivations 
for avoiding teams, like guilt avoidance, that subjects felt uncomfortable revealing. 
 
6. Conclusion: The goal of our experimental design was to study entrepreneurs’ preferences for joining 
teams versus working alone. We provide direct evidence that entrepreneurs, especially long-term 
entrepreneurs, are significantly less interested in joining teams than similar individuals. Our results 
indicate that the psychological characteristics of entrepreneurs must be considered seriously as an 
important component of entrepreneurs’ unwillingness to form partnerships. 
 
While entrepreneurs don’t particularly like joining teams, it does not follow that they are bad teammates. 
Their willingness to contribute to a team account, our experimental measure of moral hazard and free-
riding, is no worse than their peers. By extension, there is no clear reason for entrepreneurs to feel 
unusually vulnerable to moral hazard since their potential partners are not especially likely to free-ride. 
 
Several secondary results of our experiment are noteworthy. The strong age effects we observe confirm 
and extend the results of Charness and Villeval (2009). We find a negative income effect on allocating 
questions to the team account that has not been previously reported in the literature. Being cynical, we 
speculate that there is a direct link between having a high income and being unwilling to help others. We 
find that high aptitude individuals are strongly less willing to contribute questions to the team account and 
weakly less willing to join teams. These results make sense in our framwork, since contributing questions 
to the team account is relatively expensive for high aptitude individuals,24 but contrast with the finding of 
Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) that high ability types sort into teams first despite taking a hit in 
salary for this move. They suggest that non-pecuniary factors, such as a desire to teach less able 
teammates, may be the cause of the willingness of high ability types to join teams. Our team environment 
is very stark in comparison to the complex field setting of Hamilton et al. An interesting question for 
future work is what features must be added to the experimental environment to generate results similar to 
those of Hamilton et al. 
 
Much work remains to be done, using both experiments and more traditional methods such as surveys. 
The most pressing need is for future work collecting direct evidence (rather than relying on evidence from 
an unpaid post-experiment survey) that entrepreneurs’ low willingness to pay for team membership is 
driven by relatively strong preferences for autonomy and control rather than (for example) guilt 
                                                     
24 Kocher, Strauß, and Sutter (2006) also report that high aptitude individuals are relatively unwilling to join teams, 
but in their case the relatively high willingness of low aptitude individuals to join teams is driven by a desire for 
improved decisions due to joint decision making. See Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009) for related findings on 
aptitude and team composition. 
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avoidance. Also of great interest is understanding why aversion to team membership is highest for long-
term entrepreneurs. This increasing aversion to team membership may reflect either the selection process 
that leads to being a long-term entrepreneur or something about the experience of being an entrepreneur 
that changes individuals’ preferences. Given that having a partner improves the odds of a new business 
surviving (Cooper and Bruno, 1977), we conjecture that it is the experience of being an entrepreneur that 
drives the strong aversion of experienced entrepreneurs to teams. In future work, we hope to utilize both 
experiments and surveys to gather longitudinal data confirming this hypothesis.  
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